

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Classified and/or Controlled
National Intelligence to Alien Employees of
State

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PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Saigel, State
[redacted], CIA

BACKGROUND

1. Mr. Saigel had inquired concerning the above subject stating that certain of State's alien employees at present handle such intelligence and asked CIA's position. I cleared the following position with DAS [redacted] and OHR [redacted]
[redacted]

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CONVERSATION

2. I called Mr. Saigel today and advised him that the CIA position was:

a. That alien employees of State were considered foreign nationals and could not see national intelligence stamped "U. S. Officials Only" nor "Not Releaseable to Foreign Nationals."

b. That alien employees of State could handle classified national intelligence which was not controlled if they were cleared by State for that classification.

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[redacted]
Office of Intelligence Coordination

cc: Mr. Saigel

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[redacted]
AB/CD

Dissemination

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10 Nov. 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Administration)

SUBJECT: Eligibility of Foreign Nationals to Receive
Classified Information

1. The reply to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security proposal is primarily one concerning the mechanics of security clearance and has been appropriately assigned to your area for action. However, the mechanics of the proposal appear to bear on the operations of offices under my supervision.

2. There is, at present in my area, general satisfaction with the security clearance procedure of I&S and where necessary, our own procedure under NSCID 9 arrangements with respect to foreign representatives. The subject proposal would quite likely make the security clearance of foreign representatives too cumbersome and we request that you seek exemption from the proposal.

3. The following are some specific comments:

a. The proposal appears "unilateral." Some thought might be given to a "joint" system based on equating the security systems and a "need-to-know" certification.

b. The DCI now has responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with IAC concurrence determine what national intelligence should be disseminated to foreign governments. Inherent in this responsibility is the question of security of the representatives of foreign governments and apparently in the past this has been satisfactorily discharged as far as the DCI and IAC agencies are concerned.

c. Exemption of diplomatic and consular personnel and "high-ranking" officials raises the question of necessity for the establishment of this procedure to cover only intermediate and junior personnel. This might develop a tendency to use diplomatic and consular personnel as a channel.

d. As the proposal covers area "within the U. S." classified information could presumably be passed to foreign representatives "outside the U. S." without notice of the proposed procedure. This does not appear consistent.

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e. Our working relationships,
 would be encumbered.

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ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)